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Russia’s  importance  in  world  agricultural  markets  has 
grown substantially during the 2000s, on both the demand 
and supply sides. The two main developments are that ag-
ricultural imports have surged and the country has become 
a large grain exporter.
From 2000 to 2008, Russia’s agricultural imports grew 
from $7 billion to $33 billion, making the country the 
second largest agricultural importer among emerging mar-
kets, after China (Figure 1). The main imports are meats, 
processed foods, fruits, and vegetables. On the export side, 
over 2001–08, Russia’s net annual grain exports have av-
eraged 9 million metric tons (mmt; Table 1). In market-
ing year 2008/09, Russia is predicted to export 20 mmt of 
grain (net), and Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan collec-
tively about 48 mmt of grain onto the world market (FAS). 
Russia’s status as a big meat importer and grain exporter 
is a reversal of its agricultural production and trade during 
the Soviet period when Russia, and the Soviet Union as a 
whole, was a heavy producer of meats and large importer of 
grains and oilseeds (Table 1). During the 1980s, the Soviet 
Union imported an average of 34 mmt of grain per year. 
The region’s switch from annual grain importer of 34 mmt 
to grain exporter of 48 mmt in 2008/09 is a huge shift of 
over 80 mmt toward increased supply of grain on the world 
market. This article examines why these large demand and 
supply shifts in Russia’s agricultural trade have occurred, 
and the near- to mid-term outlook for trade.
Russia’s Changed Agricultural Commodity Structure
Russia’s transition from a planned to a market economy 
that began in the early 1990s fundamentally altered the 
volumes  and  commodity  composition  of  its  agricul-
tural production and trade. The changes appear to be an 
economically justifiable restructuring consistent with the 
country’s  underlying  cost  and  price  competitiveness,  or 
comparative  advantage,  across  major  agricultural  com-
modities, especially meat versus grain.
Around 1970, the Soviet government decided to ex-
pand the livestock sector, the main motive being to im-
prove consumers’ standard of living by increasing meat and 
dairy consumption. Using large budget subsidies to both 
livestock producers and consumers along with controlled 
prices  and  trade,  the  regime  succeeded  in  raising  meat 
production by over 60% between 1970 and 1990 (Lief-
ert, 2001). Because the Soviet Union could not produce 
enough animal feed to support its growing livestock herds, 
it became a large importer of feed grain, soybeans, and soy-
bean meal, to the benefit of U.S. bulk crop producers.
The move to a market economy in the 1990s reversed 
the  expansion  of  the  livestock  sector  during  the  earlier 
planned period. Because of budget stringency, the huge 
government  support  to  agriculture,  and  especially  the 
livestock sector which received the bulk of subsidies, was 
largely eliminated. Also, integration into world markets 
revealed that Russia was a high cost producer of livestock 
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goods, making it difficult to compete 
with  lower  priced  imports.  Put  in 
other words, the country had a large 
comparative disadvantage in the live-
stock sector (Liefert, 2002). Output 
of  meat  plunged,  falling  from  10.1 
mmt in 1990 to 4.4 mmt in 2000 
(Table 1). Meat imports in turn be-
gan  to  rise,  though  imports  of  not 
only meat but all agricultural goods 
fell sharply during Russia’s economic 
crisis in the late 1990s (Table 1 and 
Figure 1).
Another  reason  Russian  agricul-
tural imports began to increase dur-
ing the 1990s was because the coun-
try’s consumers were exposed to the 
array of world food products, as well 
as  other  consumer  goods,  they  had 
been denied during the planned pe-
riod. Russian consumers in particular 
became  interested  in  foreign-pro-
duced processed foods.
The  contraction  of  the  livestock 
sector during transition is also a key 
reason why Russia has become a ma-
jor grain exporter in the 2000s. Rath-
er  than  importing  grain,  soybeans, 
and soybean meal to feed a large live-
stock sector, Russia now is importing 
more meat and other livestock prod-
ucts  and  exporting  grain.  The  de-
crease in Russia’s need for animal feed 
has been so great that the country has 
been able to move from big grain im-
porter during the Soviet time to ex-
porter in this decade despite a large 
drop in grain production over the two 
periods. Russian average annual grain 
output during 2001–08 was 83 mmt, 
down from 103 mmt over 1987–90 
(Rosstat). 
Agricultural Imports Surge during 
the 2000s
Although Russia’s meat imports be-
gan to rise during the 1990s, from 
2000  to  2008  they  increased  by  a 
substantial  78%  in  volume  (FAS). 
The meat import growth was part of 
a boom in the country’s total agricul-
tural imports during the 2000s.
There were two main macroeco-
nomic  causes  of  the  import  surge. 
The first was high Russian Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) growth, which 
averaged  7%  a  year  over  2000–08. 
Rising  GDP  boosted  consumer  in-
come  and  food  demand,  benefiting 
both domestic producers and foreign 
suppliers. For example, from 2000 to 
2007  Russian  per  capita  meat  con-
sumption rose from 41 to 56 kilo-
grams (Rosstat). 
The second cause of growing ag-
ricultural  imports  was  an  improve-
ment in the price competitiveness of 
imports  vis-à-vis  Russian-produced 
goods.  During  the  2000s,  Russia’s 
nominal market exchange rate used 
to buy and sell rubles has not changed 
much against the U.S. dollar, euro, 
and other major currencies. However, 
price inflation has been much higher 
in Russia than in the United States, 
European  Union  (EU),  and  many 
other countries that export to it. Over 
2001–07, Russia’s inflation averaged 
13–14%  a  year,  resulting  in  total 
inflation during the period of about 
140% (Rosstat). Over this time, over-
all inflation in the United States was 
only 20%, and in the EU 15%. The 
greater inflation in Russia compared 
to  its  major  trading  partners  made 
Russian-produced goods more expen-
sive compared to imported products, 
such that Russians switched to buy-
ing more imports. The real exchange 
rate of the ruble captures these rela-
tionships,  as  it  equals  the  nominal 
exchange  rate  adjusted  for  Russia’s 
level of inflation relative to that of its 
trading partners. Using this measure 
of the exchange rate, the ruble appre-
ciated against the dollar in real terms 
by  over  100%  between  2000  and 
2007, and against the euro by over 
50% (ERS).
The economic crisis that hit Rus-
sia in autumn 2008 reversed the two 
macroeconomic  developments  that 
had been driving agricultural import 
growth, thereby also reversing the im-
port rise. Because of the crisis, Rus-
sian  GDP  will  almost  certainly  fall 
in 2009, and maybe also in 2010. In 
April 2009, the macroeconomic con-
sulting  firm  Global  Insight  forecast 
that 2009 GDP would decline 3.8%. 
Yet, if the economy stabilizes within 
a year or two, as Global Insight and 
other major forecasters predict, GDP 
could begin to grow again at 4–5% 
a year.
The crisis also has caused the ruble 
to  depreciate  substantially,  in  both 
nominal and real terms, mainly be-
cause of capital outflows. From mid-
July 2008 to mid-April 2009, the ru-
ble nominally depreciated against the 
U.S. dollar by 30%, with the ruble/
dollar exchange rate rising from 23.3 
to 33.5.
Yet, if both the Russian and over-
all  world  economy  begin  to  grow 
again  within  one  to  two  years,  the 
ruble  should  resume  its  real  appre-
ciation.  During  the  2000s,  Russia 
Table 1. Russian Grain and Meat Production and Trade
Grain Meat
Years Production Net	trade Production Net	trade Year
million metric tons
1987-90 103.5  (21.0) 10.1  (1.8) 1990
1991-95 87.9  (8.4) 5.8  (2.1) 1995
1996-00 65.2  (2.1) 4.4	 (1.8) 2000
2001-08 82.6  8.8  5.6  (3.2) 2007
Note:	Grain	numbers	are	average	July-June	marketing	year	values	for	the	period	identified	at	the	left.	
Meat numbers are for calendar year identified at the right. Trade values in parentheses are net imports, 
without parentheses net exports.
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had  large  total  trade  surpluses.  For 
example, in 2005 Russia’s trade sur-
plus of $118 billion equaled 15% of 
its GDP (Global Insight). The bulk 
of the country’s export earnings come 
from  oil  and  natural  gas.  Renewed 
world growth is expected to put up-
ward pressure on energy prices, such 
that Russia would probably continue 
to run trade surpluses. This in turn 
would strengthen the ruble.
Given that every year in the 2000s, 
Russia had inflation of 9% or higher, 
one can expect that over 2009–12 the 
country will experience annual infla-
tion of at least 6–10%. In April 2009, 
Global Insight forecast Russian aver-
age annual inflation over this time of 
11%. Higher inflation in Russia com-
pared to that in its main trading part-
ners will cause the ruble to continue 
to appreciate in real terms (as during 
2000–07), or in other words, will re-
duce the prices of imports relative to 
domestic production.
The  return  of  Russian  GDP 
growth  and  ruble  real  appreciation 
also should bring a return of agricul-
tural import growth, though probably 
at a lower rate than in the past eight 
years. One reason the import growth 
is  expected  to  be  lower  is  because 
GDP  growth  and  ruble  real  appre-
ciation will be at reduced rates com-
pared to past years. Another reason 
will be the high investment in Rus-
sian agriculture and the food industry 
in the past few years. From 2004 to 
2007, investment in the two activities 
rose in real terms by about 275% and 
175%,  respectively,  for  reasons  dis-
cussed in the next section (Rosstat). 
The increased domestic output from 
this  investment  will  mitigate  future 
agricultural import growth.
Russia Emerges as a Major Grain 
Exporter
As discussed earlier, a major reason 
Russia has become a grain exporter in 
the 2000s is because the contraction 
of the livestock sector during transi-
tion  substantially  reduced  domestic 
demand for feed grain. Another rea-
son  is  that,  after  falling  during  the 
1990s, Russian grain production in 
the 2000s began to rise.
The factors that explain why grain 
output has grown in the decade do 
not include a rise in grain production 
area.  Average  annual  Russian  grain 
area  over  2001–08  was  45  million 
hectares, a drop from 50 million hect-
ares over 1996–2000, and a large fall 
from 65 million hectares over 1987–
90 (Rosstat). In Russia, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan together, average annual 
grain area during 2001–08 was down 
by 30% compared to 1987–90. Most 
of the reduced grain area was not lost 
to  other  crops,  but  rather  became 
fallow. The rise in world agricultural 
and food prices in 2006–08 sparked 
interest in returning the idled grain 
area  in  this  region  to  production, 
which  could  substantially  increase 
world grain supplies. This would put 
downward pressure on world prices, 
mitigating  any  future  price  jumps 
and benefiting the consuming poor 
of the world.
During Russia’s grain price surge 
of 2006–08, area did respond to some 
degree, rising over the period by about 
5% (Rosstat). Yet, in Soviet times, the 
regime pushed grain area throughout 
the country on to marginal land, re-
sulting in much inefficient high cost 
production.  In  order  for  grain  area 
now to rebound substantially, world 
prices  probably  would  have  to  rise 
again considerably, and remain high. 
Also,  Russia  would  have  to  invest 
heavily in improving the physical and 
commercial  infrastructure  for  stor-
ing, transporting and loading grain at 
ports for export.
Given that grain area fell in the 
2000s, the reason Russian production 
rose is because of growth in yields. 
Russia’s  average  annual  grain  yield 
over 2001–08 was 1.83 tons per hect-
are,  compared  to  1.30  over  1996–
2000  (Rosstat).  The  dominant  type 
of  grain  producing  farm  in  Russia 
continues to be the inefficient former 
state and collective farm of the Soviet 
period. Although most of these farms 
have been officially reorganized dur-
ing transition as joint stock compa-
nies, they remain largely unreformed 
(Brock et al., 2008). However, a likely 
major reason for the growth in grain 
yields, as well as an overall increase 
in  the  productivity  of  resource  use 
in the grain sector, is the rise during 
the 2000s of new agricultural “opera-
tors.”  These are large vertically inte-
grated enterprises that bring invest-
ment, new technology, and superior 
managerial  practices  into  the  sector 
(Serova,  2007).  The  new  operators 
are especially attracted to grain pro-
duction,  because  of  the  profitable 
export opportunities. The new opera-
tors represent best current production 
practice  in  Russian  agriculture,  and 
continued  growth  in  Russian  grain 
yields,  production,  and  exports  de-
pends largely on whether they keep 
expanding in numbers and influence.
However,  another  reason  Rus-
sian grain yields and production have 
risen  during  the  2000s  is  favorable 
weather. The continental climate of 
Russia and other former Soviet Union 
countries  results  in  volatile  weather 
conditions for grain production, es-
pecially rainfall. Figure 2 gives Rus-
sian annual grain output and exports 
over 1995–2008. Grain output was 
low every year over 1995–2000 ex-
cept for a big upward spike in 1997. 
On the other hand, grain production 
over 2001–08 was high every year ex-
cept for a plunge in 2003. The weath-
er indicators show that in every year 
during the second half of the 1990s, 
Russia  had  unfavorable  weather  for 
grain, except for 1997, while in every 
year during the 2000s, it has had rela-
tively good weather, except for 2003. 
Also,  the  surge  in  grain  output  in 
2008 coincided with highly favorable 
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How Has Russian Policy Affected 
Agricultural Trade?
Russian  policy  during  the  2000s 
has  resisted,  rather  than  promoted, 
the  country’s  move  toward  import-
ing livestock products and exporting 
grain. In 2003, the Russian govern-
ment established restrictive tariff rate 
quotas  (TRQs)  for  imports  of  beef 
and pork, and a pure quota for poul-
try, converted in 2006 to a TRQ. In 
January 2009, the low tariff-rate quo-
tas for pork and poultry were lowered 
further  and  the  out-of-quota  tariffs 
raised, to 75% and 95%, respectively. 
During  the  2000s,  Russia  also  has 
imposed many sanitary-based restric-
tions,  and  often  complete  bans,  on 
imports of meat (especially poultry) 
and other livestock products. 
In 2005, the Russian government 
identified  agriculture  as  a  national 
priority  area  that  would  receive  in-
creased  funding  along  with  health, 
education, and housing. From 2005 
to 2007, state support to agriculture 
from the federal and regional govern-
ments together rose 87% in nominal 
rubles and 52% in real (inflation-ad-
justed) rubles (Rosstat). According to 
the government, the main objective 
of agricultural policy is to revive the 
livestock sector, which is getting the 
bulk of the new agricultural subsidies. 
Russian support to, and trade protec-
tion  for,  livestock  producers  could 
continue to increase.
In  January  2009,  the  Russian 
government established a state grain 
company.  The  officially  identi-
fied functions of the “United Grain 
Company” are to increase the state’s 
involvement  in  the  domestic  grain 
market,  increase  grain  exports,  and 
improve  the  physical  infrastructure 
for the grain sector. However, the na-
ture and full objectives of this compa-
ny are not yet clear. Might one of its 
purposes be to use the grain sector to 
further the expansion of the domes-
tic livestock sector, say by restricting 
grain exports at times of low harvests 
and high prices?
A potential constraint on future 
Russian  agricultural  policy  is  acces-
sion  to  the  World Trade  Organiza-
tion (WTO). Russia officially began 
its WTO accession bid in the mid-
1990s.  By  early  2009,  it  had  con-
cluded  bilateral  negotiations  with 
most WTO members, including the 
United States and EU. 
In  the  two  key  areas  of  import 
tariffs  and  domestic  support,  Rus-
sia  in  its  accession  negotiations  has 
been asking for bound commitments 
above the existing levels (a bound tar-
iff or support amount is a maximum 
allowable level in the future). Russia’s 
current  average  agricultural  import 
tariff is about 18%, up from 10% in 
2000. However, Russia is negotiating 
for  bound  agricultural  tariffs  above 
actual  applied  tariffs.  On  domestic 
support, Russia is asking for annual 
bound support of $9.5 billion, which 
compares  to  its  2007  actual  sup-
port level of $5.7 billion (Russia and 
World Trade Organization; Rosstat).
If  Russia  soon  joins  the  WTO, 
its negotiated bound levels of tariffs 
and support might be above the cur-
rent levels. Accession on such terms 
would not liberalize Russian agricul-
tural trade and support policies, and 
thereby  not  increase  imports.  Yet, 
the United States and other foreign 
suppliers would benefit because the 
bound levels would provide a cap on 
any future rise in tariffs and support. 
Russia’s agricultural trading partners 
might  gain  the  most  from  Russia’s 
WTO accession by having an official 
forum for challenging the country’s 
sanitary  and  phyto-sanitary  import 
restrictions.
Concluding Comments
During the 2000s, Russia has become 
a big agricultural importer, especially 
of meat and processed foods, and a 
major grain exporter. Even more so, 
Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to-
gether are now a very large grain ex-
porting region.
Russia likely will recover from its 
current economic crisis within a year 
or two. Its agricultural import growth 
thereupon  should  resume,  though 
probably at a lower rate than in past 
years. One reason for import growth 
will be rising consumer income, and 
another  expected  reason  will  be  re-
newed  appreciation  of  the  ruble  in 
real terms. Russia is likely to return 
to  the  precrisis  situation  where  its 
large exports of oil and natural gas 
put  upward  pressure  on  the  ruble’s 
exchange  rate.  A  strong  ruble  will 
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hurt the price competitiveness of all 
other  domestically  produced  trad-
able  goods,  including  agricultural 
products. Whether Russia’s grain ex-
ports keep rising largely depends on 
whether  the  productivity-enhancing 
improvements in farm management 
during the 2000s continue, as driven 
by the “new operators.”
 Russian policy statements and ac-
tions during the 2000s show stronger 
interest in reviving the livestock sec-
tor than in exploiting the country’s 
potential  as  a  grain  exporter,  and 
especially  reveal  dissatisfaction  with 
large meat imports. Policies therefore 
could expand to curb agricultural im-
ports, particularly of meat. Such poli-
cies would resist the economic forces 
driving Russia’s growing role in world 
agricultural markets.
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